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fHOUGH THE FOUNDING FATHERS believed in the necessity of establishing a gen­
uinely national government, they took great pains to design one that could not 
lightly do things to its citizens; what government might do for its citizens was to
be lim:ited to the functions of what we know now as the "watchman state.'' Thus 
the Founders composed the constitutional litany familiar to every schoolchild: 
they created a federal system, they distributed and blended powers within and 
across the federal levels, and they encouraged the occupants of the various posi­
tions to check and balance each other by structuring incentives so that one of­
ficeholder's ambitions would be likely to conflict with others'. The resulting 
system of institutional arrangements predictably hampers efforts to undertake 
major initiatives and favors maintenance of the status quo. 
Given the historical record faced by the Founders, their emphasis on con­
straining government is understandable. But we face a later historical record , 
one that shows two hundred years of increasing demands for government to act 
positively. Moreover, developments unforeseen by the Founders increasingly 
raise the likelihood that the uncoordinated actions of individuals and groups will 
inflict serious damage on the nation as a whole. The by-products of the industri­
al and technological revolutions impose physical risks not only on us , but on 
future generations as well . Resource shortages and international cartels raise the 
spectre of economic ruin. And the simple proliferation of special interests with 
their intense, particularistic demands threatens to render us politically in­
capable of taking actions that might either advance the state of society or pre­
vent foreseeable deteriorations in that state. None of this is to suggest that we 
should forget about what government can do to us-the contemporary concern 
with the proper scope and methods of government intervention in the social and 
economic orders is long overdue. But the modern age demands as well that we 
worry about OJ:!!:_��_ility to make government work for us. The problem is that 
��--a.!.�_ gradually losing that ability' and a principal reason for this loss is the 
§teady erosion of responsibility in American politics .
What do I mean by this important quality, responsibility? To say that some 
person or group is responsible for a state of affairs is to assert that he or they 
have the ability to take legitimate actions that have a major impact on that state 
of affairs. More colloquially, when someone is responsible, we know whom to 
blame. Human beings have asymmetric attitudes toward responsibility, as cap-
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tured by the saying "Success has a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan. " 
This general observation applies very much to politicians, not surprisingly, and 
this creates a problem for democratic theory, because clear location of responsi­
bility is vitally important to the operation of democratic governments. Without 
responsibility, citizens can only guess at who deserves their support; the act of 
voting loses much of its meaning. Moreover, the expectation of being held re­
sponsible provides representatives with a personal incentive to govern in their 
constituents' interest. As ordinary citizens we do not know the proper rate of 
growth of the money supply, the appropriate level of the federal deficit, the 
advantages of the MX over alternative missile systems, and so forth . We elect 
people to make those decisions . But only if those elected know they will be held 
accountable for the results of their decisions (or nondecisions, as the case may 
be), do they have a personal incentive to govern in our interest. 1 
Unfortunately, the importance of responsibility in a democracy is matched 
by the difficulty of attaining it. In an autocracy, individual responsibility suf­
fices; the location of power in a single individual locates responsibility in that 
individual as well .  But individual responsibility is insufficient whenever more 
than one person shares governmental authority. We can hold a particular con­
gressman individually responsible for a personal transgression such as bribe­
taking. We can even hold a president individually responsible for military 
moves where he presents Congress and the citizenry with afait accompli. But on 
most national issues individual responsibility is difficult to assess .  I f  one were to 
go to Washington, randomly accost a Democratic congressman, and berate him 
about a 20-percent rate of inflation, imagine the response. More than likely it 
would run, "Don't blame me. I f  'they' had done what I've advocated for x 
years, things would be fine today. "  And if one were to walk over to the White 
House and similarly confront President Carter, he would respond as he already 
has, by blaming Arabs, free-spending congressmen, special interests, and, of 
course, us. 
American institutional structure makes this kind of game-playing all too 
easy. In  order to overcome it we must lay the credit or blame for national condi­
tions on all those who had any hand in bringing them about: some form of 
collective responsibility is essential. 
The only way collective responsibility has ever existed, and can exist given 
our institutions, is through the agency of the political party; in American poli­
tics, responsibility requires cohesive parties. This is an old claim to be sure, but 
its age does not detract from its present relevance. 2 In  fact, the continuing de­
cline in public esteem for the parties and continuing efforts to "reform" them 
out of the political process suggest that old arguments for party responsibility 
have not been made often enough or, at least, convincingly enough, so I will 
make these arguments once again in this essay. 
�_!�ng _po!!tical P3:r.�Y _can generate collective responsibility by creating
incentive for leaders, followers, and po-puTirsupporters.foihiiik and act in col­
lective terms.  First, by providing party leaders with the capability (e.g . ,  control 
of institutional patronage, nominations, and so on) to discipline party members, 
genuine leadership becomes possible. Legislative output is  less likely to be a 
least common denominator-a residue of myriad conflicting proposals-and 
more likely to consist of a program actually intended to solve a problem or move 
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the nation in a particular direction. Second, the subordination of individual
officeholders to the party lessens their ability to separate themselves from party 
actions. Like it or not, their performance becomes identified with the perform­
ance of the collectivity to which they belong. Third, with individual candidate 
variation greatly reduced, voters have less incentive to support individuals and 
more incentive to support or oppose the party as a whole. And fourth, the circle 
closes as party-line voting in the electorate provides party leaders with the in­
centive to propose policies that will earn the support of a national majority, and 
party back-benchers with the personal incentive to cooperate with leaders in the 
attempt to compile a good record for the party as a whole. 
In the American contexs....:>�r()11g par.ties have traditionally cl�rifi.efi_p9li�i�s in 
two w�Y5.:..._�irst, they allow citizens to assess responsibility -easily, at least when 
the government is unified, which it more often was in earlier eras when party 
meant more than it does today. 3 Citizens need only evaluate the social, econom­
ic, and international conditions they observe and make a simple decision for or 
against change. They do not need to decide whether the energy, inflation, ur­
ban, and defense policies advocated by their congressman would be superior to 
those advocated by Carter-were any of them to be enacted!
The second way in which strong parties clarify American politics follows 
from the first. When citizens assess responsibility on the party as a whole, party 
members have personal incentives to see the party evaluated favorably. They 
have little to gain from gutting their president's program one day and attacking 
him for lack of leadership the next, since they share in the president's fate when 
Voters do not differentiate within the party. Put simply, party responsibility
provides party members with a personal stake in their collective performance. 
�dmittedly, party responsibility is a blunt instrument. The objection im-)
lllediately arises that party responsibility condemns junior Democratic repre-
sentatives to suffer electorally for an inflation they could do little to affect. An ') 
Unhappy situation, true, but unless we accept it, Congress as a whole escapes � 
electoral retribution for an inflation they could have done something to affect. 
Responsibility requires acceptance of both conditions. The choice is between a) 
blu nt instrument or none at all. 
Of course, the United States is not Great Britain. We have neither the insti­
tutions nor the traditions to support a British brand of responsibile party gov­
ernment, and I do not see either the possibility or the necessity for such a
system in America. In the past the United States has enjoyed eras in which 
Party was a much stronger force than today. And until recently-a generation,
roughly-parties have provided an "adequate" degree of collective responsibili­
ty. �hey have done so by connecting the electoral fates of party members, via
�residential coattails, for example, and by �£lsf�rrnJI1g_eJi;£tiQ� int()_!:._e_!"erenda
�·as with congressional off-year elections.
h In earlier times, when citizens voted for the party, not the person, parties
had incentives to nominate good candidates, because poor ones could have
d a�ful fallout on the ticket as a whole. 4 In particular, the existence of presi-
ent�al coattails (positive and negative) provided an inducement to avoid thenomination of narrowly based candidates, no matter how committed their sup­
�?rters. And, once in office, the existence of party voting in the electorate pro­tded party members with the incentive to compile a good party record. In
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particular, the tendency of national midterm elections to serve as referenda 0 
tht: performance of the president provided a clear inducement for congressrne 
n
to do what they could to see that their president was perceived as a solid Per� 
former. By stimulating electoral phenomena such as coattail effects and Illid. 
term referenda, party transformed some degree of personal ambition int 
concern with collective performance. 
0 
In the contemporary period, however, even the preceding tendencies to. 
ward collective responsibility have largely dissipated. As background for a dis.
cussion of this contemporary weakening of collective responsibility and its
deleterious consequences, let us briefly review the evidence for the decline of
party in America. 
The Continuing Decline of Party in the United States 
Party is a simple term that covers a multitude of complicated organizations 
and processes. It manifests itself most concretely as the set of party organiza. 
tions that exist principally at the state and local levels. It manifests itself most 
elusively as a psychological presence in the mind of the citizen. Somewhere in 
between, and partly a function of the first two, is the manifestation of party as a 
force in government. The discussion in this section will hold to this traditional 
schema, though it is clear that the three aspects of party have important 
interconnections. 
Party Organizations 
In the United States, party organization has traditionally meant state and 
local party organization. The national party generally has been a loose con­
federacy of subnational units that swings into action for a brief period every 
four years. This characterization remains true today, despite the somewhat 
greater influence and augmented functions of the national organizations. s 
Though such things are difficult to measure precisely, there is general agree­
ment that the formal party organizations have undergone a secular decline since 
theiir peak at the end of the nineteenth century. The prototype of the old-style 
organization was the urban machine, a form approximated today only in 
Chicago. 
--
Several long-term trends have served to undercut old-style party organiza­
tions. The patronage system has been steadily chopped back since passage of 
the Civil Service Act of 1 883. The social welfare functions of the parties have 
passed to the government as the modern welfare state developed. And, less 
concretely, the entire ethos of the old-style party organization is increasingly at 
odds with modern ideas of government based on rational expertise. These long­
term trends spawned specific attacks on the old party organizations. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Populists, Progressives, and as­
sorted other reformers fought electoral corruption with the Australian Ballot 
and personal registration systems. They attempted to break the hold of the 
party bosses over nominations by mandating the direct primary. They attacked 
the urban machines with drives for nonpartisan at-large elections and nonparti­
san city managers. None of these reforms destroyed the parties; they managed 
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to live with the reforms better than most reformers had hoped. But the reforms 
reflected changing popular attitudes toward the parties and accelerated the secu­
lar decline in the influence of the party organizations. 
The New Deal period temporarily arrested the deterioration of the party 
organizations, at least on the Democratic side. Unified party control under a 
"political" president provided favorable conditions for the state and local organi­
zations. 6 But following the heyday of the New Deal (and ironically, in part,
because of government assumption of subnational parties' functions) the decline 
continued. 
In the 1 970s two series of reforms further weakened the influence of orga­
nized parties in American national politics. The first was a series of legal 
changes deliberately intended to lessen organized party influence in the presi­
dential nominating process. In the Democratic party, "New Politics" activists 
captured the national party apparatus and imposed a series of rules changes 
designed to "open up" the politics of presidential nominations. The Republican 
party-long more amateur and open than the Democratic party-adopted 
weaker versions of the Democratic rules changes. In addition, modifications of 
state electoral laws to conform to the Democratic rules changes (enforced by the 
federal courts) stimulated Republican rules changes as well. Table 1 shows that 
the presidential nominating process has indeed been opened up. In little more 
than a decad1e after the disastrous 1 968 Democratic conclave, the number of 
primary states has more than doubled, and the number of delegates chosen in 
primaries has increased from little more than a third to three-quarters. More­
over, the remaining delegates emerge from caucuses far more open to mass citi­
zen participation, and the delegates themselves are more likely to be amateurs, 
than previously. 7 For example, in the four conventions from 1 956 to 1 968 more 
than 70 percent of the Democratic party's senators, 40 percent of their represen­
tatives, and 80 percent of their governors attended. In 1 97 6 the figures were 1 8  
percent, 1 5  percent, and 47 percent, respectively. 8  Today's youth can observe 
the back-room maneuvers of party bosses and favorite sons only by watching 
The Best Man on late night television. 
Table 1. Recent Changes in Presidential Nomination Process 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1980 
Number of States 
Holding Primaries 
17 
23 
30 
36 
Percentages of Delegates 
Selected in Primaries 
Democratic 
38 
61 
73 
76 
Republican 
34 
53 
68 
76 
Source: 1968-1976 figures from Austin Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," in
The New American Political System, Anthony King (ed.) (Washington, D.C. :  American En­
terprise I nstitute, 1978), Table 6-1. Figures for 1980 are from National journal, October 20, 
1979: 17:18-9. 
r 1 
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A second series of 1 970s reforms lessened the role of formal party organiZa.
tions in the conduct of political campaigns. These are financing regulations
growing out of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1 97 1  as amended in 1974 
and 1 976. In  this case the reforms were aimed at cleaning up corruption in the
financing of campaigns; their effects on the parties were a by-product, though 
many individuals accurately predicted its nature. Serious presidential can. 
didates are now publicly financed. Though the law permits the national parry to 
spend two cents per eligible voter on behalf of the nominee, it also obliges the
carndidate to set up a finance committee separate from the national party. Be.
tween this legally mandated separation and fear of violating spending limits or 
accounting regulations, for example, the law has the effect of encouraging the
candidate to keep his party at arm's length. 9 
At present only presidential candidates enjoy public financing, but a series
of new limits on contributions and expenditures affects other national races.
Prior to the implementation of the new law, data on congressional campaign 
financing were highly unreliable, but consider some of the trends that have
emerged in the short time the law has been in effect. Table 2 shows the dimin.
ished role of the parties in the financing of congressional races. In  House races 
the decline in the party proportion of funding has been made up by the gener: 
osity of political action committees (also stimulated by the new law). In the 
Senate, wealthy candidates appear to have picked up the slack left by the dimin­
ished party role. The party funding contribution in congressional races has de­
clined not only as a proportion of the total, but also in absolute dollars, and 
considerably in inflation-adjusted dollars. The limits in the new law restrict a 
House candidate to no more than $ 1 5  ,000 in funding from each of the national 
and relevant state parties (the average campaign expenditure of an incumbent in 
1 978 was about $ 1 2 1 ,000; of a challenger, about $54,000). A candidate for the 
Senate is permitted to receive a maximum of $ 1 7  ,500 from his senatorial cam. 
paign committee, plus two cents per eligible voter from the national committee 
Tablle 2. Recent Sources of Congressional Campaign Contributions (in Percentages) 
House 
I ndividual PA Cs Parties Personal 
1972 59 14 17 NA 
1978 57 2 5  7 l l 
Senate 
1972 67 12 14 
1978 70 13 6 II 
Source: Michael Malbin, "Of Mountains and Molehills: PACs, Campaigns, and Public Policy," in 
Malbin (ed.), Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws (Washington, D.C.: Ameri­
can Enterprise Institute, 1980), Table I. 
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d a like amount from the relevant state comminee (twenty-one senatorial can­
�dates spent over $ 1  million in 1 978).
There is no detailed work on the precise effects of the contribution limits, 
bUt it appears doubtful that �hey are bi�ding. If �he national party were to 
ontriblllte $ 1 5  ,000 to each of its congressional candidates, and a flat $ 1 7  ,500 toc 
ach of its senatorial candidates, that would be more than $8 million. All levels
�f the parties contributed only $ 10. 5 million of the $ 1 57 million spent in 1 978
congressional races. 
Probably more constraining than limits on what the parties can contribute to 
rbe candidates are limits on what citizens and groups can contribute to the par­
ries. Under current law, individual contributors may give $ 1 ,000 per election to 
a candidate (primary, runoff, general election), $5 ,000 per year to a political 
action committee, and $20,000 per year to a party. From the standpoint of the
Jaw, each of the two great national parties is the equivalent of four PACS. The 
p�cs themselves are limited to a $ 1 5  ,000 per year contribution to the national 
party. Thus financial angels are severely restricted. They must spread contribu­
tions around to individual candidates, each of whom is likely to regard the con­
tribution as an expression of personal worthiness and, if anything, as less reason 
than ever to think in terms of the party. 
Thie ultimate results of such reforms are easy to predict. A lesser party role 
in the nominating and financing of candidates encourages candidates to organize 
and conduct independent campaigns, which further weakens the role of parties. 
Of course, party is not the entire story in this regard. Other modern day 
change:s contribute to the diminished party role in campaign politics. For one 
thing, party foot soldiers are no longer so important, given the existence of a 
Jarge leisured middle class that participates out of duty or enjoyment, but that 
participates on behalf of particular candidates and issues rather than parties. 
Similarly, contemporary campaigns rely heavily on survey research, the mass 
media, and modern advertising methods-all provided by independent consul­
tants outside the formal party apparatus. Although these developments are not 
directly related to the contemporary reforms, their effect is the same: the dimi­
nution of the role of parties in conducting political campaigns. And if parties do 
not grant nominations, fund their choices, and work for them, why should 
those choices feel any commitment to their party? 
Party in the Electorate
In the citizenry at large, party takes the form of a psychological anachment. 
The typical American traditionally has been likely to identify with one or the 
other of the two major parties. Such identifications are transmitted across gener­
ations to some degree, and within the individual they tend to be fairly stable. 10 
But there is mounting evidence that the basis of identification lies in the individ­
ual's experiences (direct and vicarious, through family and social groups) with 
the parties in the past. 11 Our current party system, of course, is based on the 
dislocations of the Depression period and the New Deal attempts to alleviate 
them. Though only a small proportion of those who experienced the Depression 
directlly are active voters today, the general outlines of citizen party identifica­
tions much resemble those established at that time. 
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Again, there is reason to believe that the extent of citizen attachment 
parties has undergone a long-term decline from a late nineteenth century hig� �o
And. again, the New Deal appears. to have been a pe�iod during which ;h 2decline was arrested, even temporarily reversed. But agam, the decline of p e 
has reasserted itself in the 1 970s. arty 
Since 1 95 2 the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan h conducted regular national election surveys. The data elicited in such studi
as 
give us a graphic picture of the state o� pa.rty �n the e�e.
ctorate (T �ble 3 ) . As t�: 
1960s wore on, the heretofore stable d1stnbut10n of c1t1zen party 1dentificatio 
began to change in the general direction of weakened attachments to the partie
ns 
Betwee:n 1 960 and 1976 , independents, broadly defined, increased from le: ·
than a quarter to more than a third of the voting-age population. Strong identi� fiers declined from slightly more than a third to about a quarter of thepopulation. 
As the strength and extent of citizen attachments to the parties declined, the 
influence of party on the voting decisions of the citizenry similarly declined
The percentage of the voting-age population that reports consistent suppon of 
the same party's presidential candidate dropped from more than two-thirds in
1 952 to less than half in 1 976. As Table 4 shows , the percentage of voters who report a congressional vote consistent with their party identification has de­
clined from over 80 percent in the late 1950s to under 70 percent today. And as
Table 5 shows, ticket-splitting, both at the national and subnational levels, has
pr�bably doubled since the time of the first Eisenhower election. 
I ndisputably, party in the electorate has declined in recent years. Why? To 
some extent the electoral decline results from the organizational decline. Few 
party organizations any longer have the tangible incentives to turn out the faith­
ful and assure their loyalty . Candidates run independent campaigns and 
deemphasize their partisan ties whenever they see any short-term electoral gain 
in doing so. If  party is increasingly less important in the nomination and elec .. 
tion of candidates, it is not surprising that such diminished importance is re­
flected in the attitudes and behavior of the voter. 
Certain long-term sociological and technological trends also appear to work 
against party in the electorate . The population is younger, and younger citizens 
Table .l. Subjective Party Identification, 1960-1976 (in Percentages) 
Party ID 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 
Strong Democrat 21 27 20 15 15 
Weak Democrat 25 25 25 26 25 
Independent Democrat 8 8 9 10 12 
Independent 8 8 11 13 14 
I ndependent Republican 7 6 9 11 10 
Weak Republican 13 13 14 13 14 
Strong Republican 14 11 10 10 9 
Source: National Election Studies made available by the lnterUniversity Consortium for Political 
and Social Research, University of Michigan. 
'fable 4. Party-Line Votes in House Elections 
------
Year 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 
percentage 82 84 80 83 79 76 
------
Year 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 
percentage 74 76 73 74 72 69 
-----
Source: National Election Studies made available bv The l nterCniversitv Consortium for Political 
and Social Research, University of Michig
0
an. 
· 
traditionally are less attached to the parties than their elders . The population is 
rnore highly educated; fewer voters need some means of simplifying the choices 
they face in the political arena, and party, of course, has been the principal 
rneans of simplification. And the media revolution has vastly expanded the 
arnount of information easily available to the citizenry. Candidates would ha\"e 
little incentive to operate campaigns independent of the parties if there were no 
rneans to apprise the citizenry of their independence. The media provide the 
rneans . 
Finally, our present party system is an old one. For increasing numbers of 
citizens, party attachments based on the Great Depression seem lacking in rele­
vance to the problems of the late twentieth century. Beginning with the racial 
issue in the 1960s, proceeding to the social issue of the 1970s, and to the energy, 
environment, and inflation issues of today, the parties have been rent by inter­
nal dissension. Sometimes they failed to take stands, at other times they took 
the wrong ones from the standpoint of the rank and file, and at most times they 
have failed to solve the new problems in any genuine sense . Since 1965 the 
parties have done little or nothing to earn the loyalties of modern Americans. 
Party in Government 
If the organizational capabilities of the parties have weakened, and their 
psychollogical ties to the voters have loosened , one would expect predictable 
consequences for the party in government. In particular, one would expect to 
see an increasing degree of split party control within and across the levels of 
American government. The evidence on this point is overwhelming. 
At the state level, twenty-seven of the fifty governments were under divided 
party control after the 1978 election. In seventeen states a governor of one party 
opposed a legislature controlled by the other, and in ten others a bicameral 
legislature was split between the parties . By way of contrast, twenty years ago 
the number of states with divided party control was sixteen .  
At the federal level the trend is  similar. In  195 3 only twelve states sent a 
senator of each party to Washington. The number increased to sixteen by 1961, 
to twenty-one by 1972, and stands at twenty-seven today. Of course, the sena­
tors in each state are elected at different times. But the same patterns emerge 
when we examine simultaneous elections . There is an increasing tendency for 
congressional districts to support a congressman of one party and the presiden-
L 
Table 5. Trends in Ticket- Splitting, 1952-1976 (in Percentages) 
1952 
1956 
il960 
11964 
1!968 
1972 
1976 
President/House 
12 
16 
14 
15 
18 
30 
25 
State/Local 
34 
42 
46 
42 
48 
54 
Source: National Election Studies made available by The lnterUniversity Consortium for Polit' I and Social Research, University of Michigan. ica 
tial candidate of the other (Table 6). At the turn of the century it was extreme! 
rare for a congressional district to report a split result. But since that time t� 
tirend has been steadily upward . We may well be heading for a record in 1 980 as 
a vulnerable Democratic president runs with 250-odd not-so-vulnerable Demo.. 
cratic congressmen. 
Seemingly unsatisfied with the increasing tendencies of the voters to engage 
in ticket-splitting, we have added to the split of party in government by chang­
ing electoral rules in  a manner that lessens the impact of national forces. For 
example, in 1 920 thirty-five states elected their legislators, governors, and other 
state officials in presidential election years. In 1 944 thirty-two states still did so.
But in the past generation the trend has been toward isolation of state elections 
from national currents: as of 1 970 only twenty states still held their elections 
concurrently with the national ones. 13 This legal separation of the state and 
national electoral arenas helps to separate the electoral fates of party office­
holders at different levels of government, and thereby lessens their common 
interest in a good party record . 
The increased fragmentation of the party in government makes it more diffi­
cult for government officeholders to work together than in times past (not that it 
has ever been terribly easy). Voters meanwhile have a more difficult time attrib-
Table 6. Split Results, Congress and President 
Year 
Percentage 
of Districts 
Year 
Percentage 
of Districts 
1900 
3 
1948 
23 
1908 
7 
1956 
30 
1916 
I I 
1964 
33 
1924 
12 
1972 
42 
1932 
14 
1980 
1940 
15 
Source: The 1900-1964 figures are from Walter Dean Burham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of 
American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 109. The 1972 figures are from Congressional 
Quarterly's compilation of official election returns. 
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oting responsibility for government performance, and this only further frag­
fflents party control. The result is lessened collective responsibility in the 
5ystem. 
In recent years it has become a commonplace to bemoan the decline of party 
in government. National commentators nostalgically contrast the Senate under 
r,yndonJohnson with that under Robert Byrd. They deplore the cowardice and 
paralysis of a House of Representatives, supposed!y controlled by a two-thirds 
pemocratic majority under the most activist, partisan speaker since Sam Ray­
burn. And, of course, there are the unfavorable comparisons of Jimmy Carter to 
previous presidents-not only FDR and LBJ, but even Kennedy. Such observa­
tions may be descriptively accurate, but they are not very illuminating.' It is not 
enough to call for more inspiring presidential leadership and to demand that the 
rnajority party in Congress show more readiness to bite the bullet. Our present 
national problems should be recognized as the outgrowths of the increasing 
separation of the presidential and congressional electoral arenas. 
By now it is widely understood that senatorial races are in a class by them­
selves. The visibility of the office attracts the attention of the media as well as 
that of organized interest groups. Celebrities and plutocrats find the office at­
tractive. Thus massive media campaigns and the politics of personality increas­
ingly affect these races. Senate elections now are most notable for their 
idiosyncracy, and consequentially for their growing volatility; correspondingly, 
such general forces as the president and the party are less influential in sena­
torial voting today than previously. 
What is less often recognized is that House elections have grown increas­
ingly idiosyncratic as well. I have already discussed the declining importance of 
party identilfication in House voting and the increasing number of split results at 
the district level. These trends are both cause and consequence of incumbent 
efforts to insulate themselves from the electoral effects of national conditions. 
Figure I shows the distribution of the vote garnered by the Democratic can­
didate in incumbent-contested districts in 1948 and 1972. 14 Evidently, a mas­
sive chang1:: took place in the past generation. In 1948 most congressional 
districts were clustered around the 50-percent mark (an even split between the 
parties); most districts now are clustered away from the point of equal division. 
Two obvious questions arise: Why has the change occurred, and does it matter? 
Taking the second question first, Figure l suggests a bleak future for such 
electoral phenomena as presidential coattails and midterm referenda on presi­
dential performance. Consider a swing of 5 percent in the congressional vote 
owing to a particularly attractive (or repulsive) presidential candidate or an espe­
cially poor performance by a president. In the world represented by the 1948 
diagram, such a swing has major consequences: it shifts a large proportion of 
districts aciross the 50-percent mark. The shift provides a new president with a 
"mandate" in an on-year election and constitutes a strong "message" to the pres­
ident in an off-year election. In the world represented by the 1972 diagram, 
however, the hypothesized 5-percent shift has little effect: few seats are close 
enough to t:he tipping point to shift parties under the hypothesized swing. The 
president's victory is termed a "personal" victory by the media, or the midterm 
result is interpreted as a reflection of personal and local concerns rather than 
national ones. 
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Why has the distribution of the congressional voting results changed over 
tirne? Elsewhere I have argued that much of the transformation results from a
remporal change in the basis of congressional voting.15 We have seen that party 
iofluencie in House voting has lessened. And, judging by the number of Demo­
crats successfully hanging onto traditional Republican districts, programmatic 
aod ideological influences on House voting probably have declined as well. 
What has taken up the slack left by the weakening of the traditional determi­
oaots of congressional voting? It appears that a variety of personal and local 
influences now play a major role in citizen evaluations of their representatives. tt> 
Along with the expansion of the federal presence in American life, the tradition­
al role of the congressman as an all-purpose ombudsman has greatly expanded. 
Tens of millions of citizens now are directly affected by federal decisions. Myri­
ad programs provide opportunities to profit from government largesse, and 
myriad regulations impose costs and/or constraints on citizen activities. And, 
whether seeking to gain profit or avoid costs, citizens seek the aid of their con­
gressmen. When a court imposes a desegregation plan on an urban school 
board, the congressional offices immediately are contacted for aid in safeguard­
ing existing sources of funding and in determining eligibility for new ones. 
When a major employer announces plans to quit an area, the congressional 
offices immediately are contacted to explore possibilities for using federal pro­
grams to persuade the employer to reconsider. Contractors appreciate a good 
congressional word with DOD procurement officers. Local artistic groups cannot 
survive without NEA funding. And, of course, there are the major individual 
programs such as social security and veterans' benefits that create a steady de­
mand for congressional information and aid services. Such activities are nonpar­
tisan, nonideological, and, most important, noncontroversial. Moreover, the 
contribution of the congressman in the realm of district service appears consid­
erably greater than the impact of his or her single vote on major national issues. 
Constituents respond rationally to this modern state of affairs by weighing non­
programmatic constituency service heavily when casting their congressional 
votes. And this emphasis on the part of constituents provides the means for 
incumbents to solidify their hold on the office. Even if elected by a narrow 
margin, diligent service activities enable a congressman to neutralize or even 
convert a portion of those who would otherwise oppose him on policy or ideo­
logical grounds. Emphasis on local, nonpartisan factors in congressional voting 
enables the modern congressman to withstand national swings, whereas yester­
year's uninsulated congressmen were more dependent on preventing the occur­
rence of the swings. 
Actually, the insulation of the modern congressman from national forces is 
even more complete than the preceding discussion suggests. Not only are few 
represientatives so vulnerable that a reaction to a presidential candidate or his 
performance would turn them out of office, but such reactions themselves are 
less likely to find a reflection in the congressional voting. Several years ago 
Professor Edward Tufte formulated an elegant statistical model that predicts 
the magnitude of the in-party's losses in midterm elections as a function of two 
variables, the popularity of the incumbent president and the state of the national 
economy as measured by changes in real income.17 For most of the post-World 
" 
I 
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War I I  period the model predicts quite accurately. But in recent years the pre. 
dictions have begun to go awry; specifically, in 1 974 and 1 978 the model signifi. 
candy overpredicts the losses of the in-party.18 The reason is quite apparent. A.s
congressmen increasingly build personal organizations (largely with taxpayer.
provided offices, staff, and communications resources) and base their campaigns 
on local issues and their personal record of service to the district, national condi­
tions and the performance of the party leader have less and less of an impact on
House races. I n  fact, analysis of the 1 978 Center for Political Studies Congres­
sional Election Study reveals that evaluations of President Carter's performance
had no effect on the electoral fortunes of Democratic incumbents, and citizen 
evaluations of government's handling of the national economy had only the bar­
est trace of an impact.19 
The effects of the insulation of congressional incumbents have begun to 
show up in a systematic way in the governmental arena. Table 7 presents data
on presidential success and presidential support in Congress for the first two 
years of the administrations of our last five elected presidents. As is evident ' Carter ('77-78) was less successful than earlier presidents who enjoyed a Con-
gress controlled by their own party; he was only as successful as Nixon, who 
faced an opposition Congress. Moreover, in the House, Carter has done rela­
tively poorly in gaining the support of his own party. I t  is noteworthy that John 
F. Kennedy ('6 1 -62) earned a significantly higher level of support from a con­
gressional party that was nearly half Southern, whereas Carter enjoyed a ma­
jority in which the regional split was much less severe. 20 
Of course, it is possible to discount the preceding argument as an unjustified 
generalization of a unique situation -a particularly inept president, a Congress 
full of prima donnas still flexing their post-Watergate muscles, and so on. But I 
think not. The withering away of the party organizations and the weakening of 
party in the electorate have begun to show up as disarray in the party in govern­
ment. As the electoral fates of congressmen and the president have diverged, 
their incentives to cooperate have diverged as well. Congressmen have little 
personal incentive to bear any risk in their president's behalf, since they no 
longer expect to gain much from his successes or suffer much from his failures. 
Only those who personally agree with the president's program and/or those who 
Talble 7. Recent Trends in Congressional Support of the Executive (in Percentages) 
Presidential 
Congress Year Success 
83rd '53-54 83 
87th '61-62 83 
89th '65-66 87 
91st '69-70 76 
95th '77-78 77 
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 
Presidential Support 
within His Party 
House Senate 
72 72 
73 64 
69 61 
62 63 
61 67 
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find th�1t program well suited for their particular district support the president.
j\od there are not enough of these to construct the coalitions necessary for ac­
tion on the major issues now facing the country. By holding only the president
responsible for national conditions, the electorate enables officialdom as a whole
ro escape responsibility. This situation lies at the root of many of the problems
that now plague American public life.
Some Consequences of the Decline of Collective Responsibility 
_The w_eakening ofparty_has contributed directly to the severity of several of 
rheilllportam problems the nation faces. For some of these, such as the govern-
_.meot's_inahility to deal with infiation_l!_nd ef!c:Egy, the connections are obvious.
But for other problems, such as the growing importance of single-issue politics
and the grg_wing alienation of the American citi:z.enry, the connections are more 
subtle. 
lmmobilism 
As the electoral interdependence of the party in government declines, its 
ability to act also declines. If responsibility can be shifted to another level or to
another officeholder, there is less incentive to stick one's own neck out in an
attempt to solve a given problem. Leadership becomes more difficult, t�yer� 
prese°-;
t"-:-bi�� towa�d the _sho�t-term soluti()nE�£_()1}1es �_()re pronounced, and the
-possibility of solvmg any given problem lessens. 
Consider the two critical problems facing the country today, energy and 
inflation. Major energy problems were forecast years ago, the 197 3 embargo
underlined the dangers, and yet what passes for our national energy policy is 
still only a weak set of jerry-built compromises achieved at the expense of years 
of political infighting. The related inflation problem has festered for more than a
decade, and our current president is on his fourth anti-inflation plan, a set of 
proposals widely regard_
e? as yet another instance of too little, too late. The
failures of policy-making in these areas are easy to identify and explain. A po­
tential problem is identified, and actions that might head it off are proposed "for 
discussion." But the problem lies in the future, while the solutions impose costs 
in the present. So politicians dismiss the solutions as unfeasible and act as 
though the problem will go away. When it doesn't, popular concern increases. 
The president, in particular, feels compelled to act-he will be held respon­
sible, both at election time and in the judgment of history. But congressmen 
expect to bear much less responsibility; moreover, the representatives face an 
electio111 in less than two years, whereas the president can wait at least four 
(longer for the lame duck) for the results of his policy to become evident. Con­
gressmen, logically enough, rebel. They denounce every proposed initiative as 
unfair, which simply means that it imposes costs on their constituents, whereas 
they prefer the costs to fall on everyone else's constituents. At first, no policy 
will be adopted; later, as pressure builds, Congress adopts a weak and inef­
fectual! policy for symbolic purposes. Then, as the problem continues to 
worsen, congressmen join with the press and the public and attack the president 
for failures of leadership. 
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The preceding scenario is simplified, to be sure, but largely accurate, and .
my opinion, rather disgusting. What makes it possible is the electoral fragrne 
In
tation produced by the decline of party. Members of Congress are aware th
n
­
national problems arising from inaction will have little political impact on the 
at 
and that the president's failures in dealing with those problems will have si:'
larly little impact. Responsibility for inflation and energy problems? Don't l0o� 
at congressmen. 
In 1958 the Fourth Republic of France collapsed after years of immobilisrn 
The features of congressional policy-making just discussed were carried to thei
.
logical extremes in that Parliamentary regime. According to contemporary 0� 
servers, the basic principle of the French Deputy was to avoid responsibility. 2 1
To achieve that goal the deputies followed subsidiary rules, the most important
of which was delay. Action would take place only when crisis removed any 
possible alternative to action (and most of the alternative actions as well) .  A. 
slogan of the time was "Those who crawl do not fall." 
No one seriously believes that the American constitutional order is in danger
of collapse (and certainly we have no de Gaulle waiting in the wings). But politi­
cal inability to take actions that entail short-run costs ordinarily will result in
much !higher costs in the long run- we cannot continually depend on the tech­
nological fix. So the present American immobilism cannot be dismissed lightly. 
The sad thing is that the American people appear to understand the depth of 
our present problems and, at least in principle, appear prepared to sacrifice in 
furtherance of the long-run good. But they will not have an opportunity to 
choose between two or more such long-term plans. Although both parties
promise tough , equitable policies, in the present state of our politics, neither can 
deliver. 
Single-Issue Politics 
In  recent years both political analysts and politicians have decried the in­
creased importance of single-issue groups in American politics. Some in fact 
would claim that the present immobilism in our politics owes more to the rise of 
single-iissue groups than to the decline of party. A little thought, however, 
should reveal that the two trends are connected. Is single-issue politics a recent 
phenomenon? The contention is doubtful; such groups have always been active 
participants in American politics. The gun lobby already was a classic example 
at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. And however impressive the 
antiabortionists appear today, remember the temperance movement, which suc­
ceeded in getting its constitutional amendment. American history contains nu­
merous forerunners of today's groups , from anti-Masons to abolitionists to the 
Klan -singularity of purpose is by no means a modern phenomenon. Why, 
then, do we hear all the contemporary hoopla about single-issue groups? Prob­
ably because politicians fear them now more than before and thus allow them to 
play a larger role in our politics. Why should this be so? _Simply because the 
parties are _too weak to protect their members and thus to contain- single-Issue­
politics. -
In earlier times single-issue groups were under greater pressures to reach 
acc--Oinmodations �ith the parties. After all, the parties nominated candidates, 
sin--. ·
' 
... 
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financed candidates, worked for candidates, and, perhaps most important, par­
ry voting protected candidates. When a contemporary single-issue group threat­
ens to "get" an officeholder, the threat must be taken seriously. The group can
go into his district, recruit a primary or general election challenger, or both, and
bankroll that candidate. Even if the sentiment espoused by the group is not the
majority sentiment of the district, few officeholders relish the thought of a
strong, well-financed opponent. Things were different when strong parties ex­
isted. Party leaders controlled the nomination process and would fight to main­
tain that control. An outside challenge would merely serve to galvanize the
party into action to protect its prerogatives. Only if a single-issue group repre­
sented the dominant sentiment in a given area could it count on controlling the
party organization itself, and thereby electoral politics in that area. 
Not only did the party organization have greater ability to resist single-issue 
pressures at the electoral level, but the party in government had greater ability 
ro control the agenda, and thereby contain single-issue pressures at the policy­
rnaking level. Today we seem condemned to go through an annual agony over 
federal abortion funding. There is little doubt that politicians on both sides 
would prefer to reach some reasonable compromise at the committee level and 
settle the issue. But in today's decentralized Congress there is no way to put the 
lid on. In contrast, historians tell us that in the late nineteenth century a large 
portion of the Republican constituency was far less interested in the tariff and 
other questions of national economic development than in whether German 
irnmigrants should be permitted to teach their native language in their local 
schools, and whether Catholics and "liturgical Protestants" should be permitted 
ro consume alcohol. 22 Interestingly, however, the national agenda of the period 
is devoid of such issues. And when they do show up on the state level, the 
exceptions prove the rule; they produce party splits and striking defeats for the 
party that allowed them to surface. 23 
One can cite more recent examples as well. Prior to 1 970 popular com­
mentators frequently criticized the autocratic antimajoritarian behavior of con­
gressional committee chairmen in general, and of the entire Rules Committee in 
particular. It is certainly true that the seniority leadership killed many bills the 
rank and file might have passed if left to their own devices . But congressional 
scholars were always aware as well that the seniority leadership buried many 
bills that the rank and file wanted buried but lacked the political courage to bury 
themselves. In  1 96 l ,  for example, the House Rules Committee was roundly
condemned for killing a major federal aid to education bill over the question of 
extension of that aid to parochial schools. Contemporary accounts, however, 
suggest that congressmen regarded the action of the Rules Committee as a pub­
lic service. 24 Of course, control of the agenda is a double-edged sword (a point 
we return to below), but today commentators on single-issue groups clearly are 
coneierned with too little control rather than too much. 
In sum, a_ S!�ong party that is held accOU[l!abl� for _the government of a 
�'.°.:5-t:i_te_ has b()t� !he -�b_il�ty _�l1��he incentive to contain particularistic pres­
sures: It controls nominations, elections, and the agenda, and it collectively 
��es that small minorities are small minorities no matter how intense they
are. But as the parties decline they lose control over nominations and cam­
paigns, they lose the loyalty of the voters, and they lose control of the agenda. 
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Party officeholders cease to be held collectively accountable for party perfo 
ance, but they become individually exposed to the political pressure of my;.
rn­
interest groups. The decline of party permits interest groups to wield gre 
lad 
influence, their success encourages the formation of still more interest gro:
ter
politics becomes increasingly fragmented, and collective responsibility beco 
Ps,
· 1 1  I · Illes st1 more e us1ve. 
Popular Alienation from Government 
For at least a decade political analysts have pondered the significance f 
survey data indicative of a steady increase in the alienation of the Americ: 
public from the political process. Table 8 presents some representative dat � 
two-thirds of the American public feel the government is run for the benefit �f 
big interests rather than for the people as a whole, three-quarters believe that
government officials waste a lot of tax money, and half flatly agree with the
statement that government officials are basically incompetent. The American
public is in a nasty mood, a cynical, distrusting, and resentful mood. The ques. 
tion is, Why? 
Specific events and personalities clearly have some effect: we see pro. 
nounced "Watergate effects" between 1972 and 1976. But the trends clearly
began much earlier. Indeed, the first political science studies analyzing the
trends were based on data no later than 1972. 25 At the other extreme it also
appears that the American data are only the strongest manifestation of a pattern
evident in many democracies, perhaps for reasons common to all countries in 
the present era, perhaps not. I do think it probable, however, that the trends 
thus far discussed bear some relation to the popular mood in the United States. 
If the same national problems not only persist but worsen while ever-greater 
amounts of revenue are directed at them, why shouldn't the typical citizen con­
clude that most of the money must be wasted by incompetent officials? If nar­
rowly based interest groups increasingly affect our politics, why shouldn't 
citizens increasingly conclude that the interests run the government? For fifteen 
years the citizenry has listened to a steady stream of promises but has seen very 
li1ttle in the way of follow-through. An increasing proportion of the electorate 
Table 8. Recent Trends in Political Alienation and Distrust (in Percentages) 
1964 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1978 
Government Run 
for Few Big 
I nterests 
29 
39 
45 
66 
68 
Government Government Officials 
Officials Don't Know What 
Waste "A Lot" They're Doing 
46 2 7  
5 7  3 6  
5 6  3 4  
74 49 
77 50 
Source: National Election Studies made available by The lnterUniversity Consortium for Political 
and Social Research, U niversity of Michigan. 
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does not believe that elections make a difference, a fact that largely explains the 
much-discussed post- 1 960 decline in voting turnout. 26 
Continued public disillusionment with the political process poses several 
real dangers. For one thing, disillusionment begets further disillusionment. 
Leadership becomes more difficult if citizens do not trust their leaders and will 
not give them the benefit of a doubt. Policy failure becomes more likely if citi­
zens expect the policy to fail. Waste increases and government compt.-ence de­
creases as citizen disrespect for politics encourages a lesser breed of person to 
rnake careers in government. And "government by a few big interests" becomes 
rnore than a cliche if citizens increasingly decide the cliche is true and cease 
participating for that reason. .
Finally, there is the real danger that continued disappointment with particu­
lar government officials ultimately metamorphoses .ato disillusionment with 
government per se. Increasing numbers of citizens believe that government is 
not simply overextended but perhaps incapable of any further bettering of the 
world. Yes, government is overextended, inefficiency is pervasive, and inef­
fectiveness is all too common. But government is one of the few instruments of 
collective action we have, and even those committed to selective pruning of 
government programs cannot blithely allow the concept of an activist govern­
ment to fall into disrepute. 
The concept of democracy does not submit to precise definition, a claim 
supported by the existence of numerous nonidentical definitions. To most 
people democracy embodies a number of valued qualities . Unfortunately, there 
is no reason to believe that all such valued qualities are mutually compatible . At 
the least, maximizing the attainment of one quality may require accepting mid­
dling levels of another. 
Recent American political thought has emphasized government of the people 
and by the people. Attempts have been made to insure that all preferences re­
ceive a hearing, especially through direct expression of those preferences, but if 
not, at least through faithful representation. Citizen participation is the reigning 
value, and arrangements that foster widespread participation are much in favor. 
Of late, however, some political commentators have begun to wonder 
whether contemporary thought places sufficient emphasis on government for the 
people. In stressing participation have we lost sight of accountability? Surely, we
should be as concerned with what government produces as with how many 
participate. What good is participation if the citizenry is unable to determine 
who merits their support?27 
Participation and responsibility are not logically incompatible, but there is a 
degree of tension between the two, and the quest for either may be carried to 
extremes . Participation maximizers find themselves involved with quotas and 
virtual representation schemes, while responsibility maximizers can find them­
selves with a closed shop under boss rule . 28 Moreover, both qualities can weak­
en the democracy they supposedly underpin. Unfettered participation produces 
Hyde Amendments and immobilism. Responsible parties can use agenda power 
to thwart democratic decision -for more than a century the Democratic party 
-----·-··------- --· 
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used what control it had to suppress the racial issue. Neither participation no 
responsibility should be pursued at the expense of all other values, but that t
what has happened with participation over the course of the past two decades 
s
and we now reap the consequences in our politics. ' 
In l 970 journalist David Broder wrote:
what we ha,·e is a society in which discontent, disbelief, cynicism and political 
inertia characterize the public mood; a country whose economy suffers from severe 
dislocations, whose currency is endangered, where unemployment and inflation 
coexist, where increasing numbers of people and even giant enterprises live on the 
public dole; a country whose two races continue to withdraw from each other in 
growing physical and social isolation; a country whose major public institutions 
command steadily less allegiance from its citizens; whose education, transporta­
tion, law enforcement, health and sanitation systems fall far short of filling their 
functions; a country whose largest city is close to being ungovernable and uninha­
bitable; and a country still far from reconciling its international responsibilities 
with its unmet domestic needs. 
\\'e are in trouble.29  
Broder is not a Cassandra, and he was writing before FECA, before the OPEc
embargo, before Watergate, and before Jimmy Carter. If he was correct that we 
were in trouble then, what about now? 
The depressing thing is that no rays of light shine through the dark clouds. 
The trends that underlie the decline of parties continue unabated, and the kinds 
of structural reforms that might o\·erride those trends are too sweeping and/or 
outlandish to stand any chance of adoption. 30 Through a complex mixture of 
accident and intention we have constructed for ourselves a system that articu­
lates interests superbly but aggregates them poorly. We hold our politicians 
individually accountable for the proposals they advocate, but less so for the 
adoption of those proposals, and not at all for overseeing the implementation of 
those proposals and the evaluation of their results. In contemporary America 
officials do not govern, they merely posture. 
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prevent split-tiicket voting and to permit campaign contributions only to parties. At the constitution­
al level, giving the president the power of dissolution and replacing the single-member district 
system with proportional representatio'! would probably unify the party in government much more 
than at present. Obviously, changes such as these are not only highly improbable but also ex­
ceedingly risky, since we cannot accurately predict the unintended consequences that surely would 
accompany them. 
